Since late 2024, Colombian mercenaries have become integral components of Rapid Support Forces operations in Sudan, particularly throughout Darfur, where they have substantially enhanced the paramilitary’s capacity to commit atrocities amid ongoing genocide allegations against non-Arab populations including the Masalit.
These fighters, predominantly retired Colombian army veterans with extensive counterinsurgency experience from operations against FARC guerrillas, have been recruited primarily through UAE-based firms and deployed in specialised roles encompassing drone operations, mortar strikes, and training programs for local recruits that include children. Their involvement, first revealed in December 2024 by Colombian investigative outlet La Silla Vacía, has generated international condemnation, prompting Colombia to issue multiple apologies and propose comprehensive legislation banning mercenarism. As of October 31, 2025, their continued presence fuels RSF territorial advances, most notably in the fall of El Fasher, where over 2,000 civilians were killed within days through executions and coordinated hospital attacks.
The recruitment infrastructure draws from a pool exceeding 500,000 ex-military personnel in Colombia. Many retire early, around age 40, due to inadequate pensions and limited civilian employment opportunities, making high-paying foreign contracts particularly attractive. Recruitment operations occur through WhatsApp campaigns and private military companies such as A4SI, owned by Claudia Viviana Oliveros, wife of key operator Colonel Álvaro Quijano. A4SI partners with the UAE-based Global Security Service Group headquartered in Dubai. Standard contracts promise monthly compensation ranging from $2,600 to $5,000 for ostensible “oil site security” positions in the Middle East or Africa, requiring medical examinations in Bogotá and non-disclosure agreements while deliberately omitting combat details. Some recruits, like the pseudonymous “Carlos,” knowingly accepted contracts for African warfare following prior deployments in Ukraine, but the majority were deceived, leading to approximately 80 returns by mid-2025.
Initial deployments in late 2024 routed through Abu Dhabi to Benghazi, Libya, where fighters waited weeks in barracks before undertaking overland Sahara treks in pickup trucks to al-Uwaynat on the Sudan-Libya-Chad border. There they were transferred to what sources describe as a “pirate crew” for final transport legs. Following increased international scrutiny, these pathways shifted considerably. Current routes transit through Madrid to Ethiopia, then to the UAE-operated Bosaso base in Somalia, which stamps passports, before continuing to N’Djamena, Chad, and completing a two-hour flight to Nyala, Sudan. Nyala functions as the RSF’s primary rear hub, where three new hangars for drone operations were constructed between January and February 2025. Over 500,000 uninspected cargo containers transit Bosaso annually, effectively shielding arms shipments and personnel movements. Social media footage from August 2025 documents Colombians training Somali youth recruits at camps before Sudan deployment.
Current estimates place 300 to 380 active Colombian mercenaries as of October 2025, organised into the “Desert Wolves” battalion comprising four companies of approximately 120 to 150 fighters each from initial deployment waves. These consist of former Colombian officers and enlisted personnel. Command structure centers on Lieutenant Colonel Iván Darío Castillo Rodríguez as battalion commander and Major John Jairo Mondol Duque as deputy. An 18-page leaked operations manual, rarely circulated publicly, details protocols ostensibly addressing human rights compliance (directly contradicting documented RSF atrocities) alongside practical guidance for sandstorm evasion and responses to Sudanese airstrikes. “Tayra!” serves as the warning for approaching jets. Arriving personnel receive arms en route including drones, RPGs, and missiles, though no dedicated medical personnel accompany units, forcing Colombian mercenaries to treat RSF wounded, including fighters as young as 10 to 11 years old.
Casualty figures remain disputed and fragmentary. Confirmed deaths include three mercenaries killed by a bomb in October 2024, whose bodies remain unrepatriated despite diplomatic efforts coordinated through Egypt. Corporal Christian Lombana Moncayo sustained a crushed leg during a November 2024 ambush at the Libya-Chad-Sudan border and received treatment in the UAE. The Sudanese Armed Forces claims killing 22 Colombians and four Emiratis through suicide drone strikes on November 29, 2024, though mercenary sources attribute these deaths to Russian Africa Corps (previously known as Wagner) fighters. No bodies have been exchanged for verification. In August 2025, SAF forces reportedly downed an Emirati plane at Nyala, allegedly killing over 40 Colombians along with arms consignments. The UAE denies this claim. Social media posts sharing identification documents from neutralized fighters, such as Edwin Patiño wearing UAE military patches, confirm ongoing losses.
The Desert Wolves specialise in urban assault operations, sniper deployment, and drone and mortar support, embedding directly with RSF units throughout El Fasher’s 551-day siege that concluded in October 2025. Geolocated footage from January 2025 documents them firing mortars into El Fasher’s population center. August 2025 videos capture platoons engaged in combat with SAF forces near mosques, conducting tactical retreats amid sustained gunfire to extract wounded personnel. Their primary function involves training thousands of recruits at Nyala camps, predominantly child soldiers with no prior weapons familiarity. They instruct these recruits in assault rifle operation, machine gun deployment, and RPG usage before immediate frontline dispatch. As Carlos stated, “We were training them to get killed.” Videos depict teenage recruits displaying victory signs following abbreviated training sessions. One video shows a child struck by a kamikaze drone.
Within genocide hotspots, Colombian mercenaries occupied Zamzam camp following the April 2025 massacre that killed between 300 and 1,500 civilians. They provided tactical support for El Fasher executions, including construction of a 20-mile perimeter wall designed to trap civilian populations. Social media posts from October 2025 directly link them to coordinated hospital assaults. RSF commanders such as “Gog” openly boast of rape and looting privileges. These mercenaries provide critical “plausible deniability” for UAE involvement, circumventing international law while directly enabling ethnic cleansing operations. Additional underreported connections suggest Libyan intelligence leaks to SAF forces following tensions in Benghazi. Unpaid $5,000 bonuses and insurance claims from A4SI fuel ongoing desertions. Colombia’s proposed anti-mercenary legislation, currently in its second Senate reading as of October 2025, faces procedural delays amid continued recruitment flows.
Following El Fasher’s fall, Colombian mercenaries conduct patrols on motorcycles and camels, systematically targeting hospitals and schools. Social media videos from October 30 document them in active firefights, with SAF conducting airdrops to counter their operations. Sudan’s submissions to United Nations bodies detail GSSG’s operational role. The UAE categorically denies these claims, though experts increasingly urge targeted sanctions. Colombian Foreign Minister Murillo condemned these actions in December 2024 diplomatic communications, yet repatriation efforts lag significantly behind stated commitments.
These mercenaries internationalise Sudan’s genocide, synthesizing Gulf proxy warfare ambitions with Latin American labour export dynamics. The network exposed through intelligence leaks (including classified operational orders and adaptive route modifications) shows systematic evasion of international scrutiny while prolonging atrocities undertaken for resource appropriation, particularly gold mining and port access. Accountability requires comprehensive tracing of GSSG and A4SI financial networks alongside rigorous monitoring of cargo flows through Bosaso and related transit hubs.