The Iran-Russia Strategic Partnership

An Asymmetric Relationship Constrained by Structural Realities

The January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Tehran and Moscow has been characterized by both parties as a historic deepening of bilateral ties. However, an analysis of the relationship’s mechanics reveals a fundamentally asymmetric arrangement that favors Russian interests while imposing significant costs on Iran. This asymmetry persists despite Iran’s substantial material contributions to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. It stems from three structural factors: Moscow’s strategic prioritization of relations with Israel and Gulf states, Iran’s constitutional constraints on foreign alliances, and Russia’s diminishing military dependence on Iranian support.

The Constitutional Prohibition on Surrendering Sovereignty

Iran’s constitutional framework establishes an absolute prohibition on ceding sovereignty that fundamentally shapes and limits the nature of any foreign alliance.

Article 9 of Iran’s Constitution declares: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and their preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens. No individual, group, or authority has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon the political, cultural, economic, and military independence or the territorial integrity of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom.” This provision creates an insurmountable barrier to the type of binding military alliance that would provide Iran with genuine security guarantees. Any agreement that subordinates Iranian decision-making to foreign powers even ostensible allies would violate this constitutional mandate. The Constitution further mandates that the Army must be Islamic and popular, explicitly stating: “No foreign individual may be admitted to the Army or the security forces of the country. Establishment of any kind of foreign military base in the country, even if it is in the name of peaceful purposes, is prohibited.”

These provisions, reinforced by foreign policy articles, create a comprehensive constitutional architecture that prevents Iran from entering Warsaw Pact-style arrangements or allowing the degree of military integration that characterizes formal alliances. Iranian leaders cannot legally grant Russia basing rights, permit Russian military advisers embedded authority over Iranian forces, or commit to automatic military responses to Russian requests all hallmarks of genuine alliance relationships. This constitutional constraint is not merely theoretical. Iran’s Parliament ratified the Russia treaty on May 21, 2025, with the Guardian Council charged with reviewing legislation for constitutional compliance approving it on June 11. The Guardian Council’s approval indicates the treaty was carefully drafted to avoid constitutional violations, necessarily limiting the depth of commitments it could contain.

The practical effect is straightforward: Russia faces no comparable constitutional constraints and can calibrate its Iran policy based purely on strategic interest, while Iranian officials operate within legal boundaries that prevent the surrender of sovereignty to any power. This structural asymmetry ensures Iran cannot become a Russian client state, even if strategic circumstances might otherwise push in that direction.

The One-Sided Military Exchange

Tehran has provided considerable assistance to Russia since 2022, including unmanned aerial systems, artillery shells, and several hundred Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missiles. Iran also helped Russia construct a sprawling drone manufacturing facility capable of producing thousands of units for battlefield deployment.

Russia’s reciprocation has been markedly more limited. In exchange, Moscow supplied Iran with Yak-130 pilot training aircraft, Mi-28 attack helicopters, assistance to Iran’s space and missile programs, and domestic surveillance technology. Critically, the advanced defensive systems Iran has sought for years remain undelivered. The most significant weapons systems Iran requested the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jets have either been withheld entirely or delivered in insufficient quantities. Iranian officials have publicly alleged that Russia’s refusal to provide the S-400 stems from Moscow’s desire to maintain positive relations with Israel. One Iranian official noted that Russia proved willing to sell S-400 systems to Turkey, a NATO member, while withholding them from Iran despite Tehran’s drone support during the Ukraine war.

Russia’s Calculated Restraint During Iran’s Crisis

The limits of the partnership became starkly evident during the June 2025 Israel-Iran escalation. When Israel and the United States conducted strikes against Iranian facilities, Russian officials emphasized that the treaty did not constitute a military alliance and that Russia was not obliged to provide military assistance in the event of an attack on Iran. Despite formal condemnation of the attacks, Russia’s backing appeared confined to diplomacy. President Putin refrained from pledging specific assistance to his main regional ally, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noting that Moscow had offered to mediate but emphasizing that further action would depend on Iran’s needs.

This muted response occurred despite Iran being one of the few countries actively supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, supplying drones, arms, and military equipment. The contrast between Iranian material support for Russia’s war effort and Russian rhetorical support during Iran’s security crisis illuminates the relationship’s fundamental imbalance.

The Absence of Binding Commitments

The January 2025 treaty lacks a mutual defense clause and imposes no direct obligations on either party. It simply formalizes close ties that developed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. An analysis of the treaty text reveals extensive use of non-binding language. The security provisions in the 2025 treaty were nearly identical to those in the 2001 treaty nothing substantive changed in almost a quarter century regarding mutual defense arrangements. Unlike NATO’s Article Five collective defense mechanism, the Iran-Russia treaty relies on military cooperation and exchange without establishing mutual defense obligations.

Military cooperation remains case-specific, requiring separate agreements as situations arise, highlighting the non-binding nature of the arrangement and making its practical effectiveness questionable.

Russia’s Competing Regional Priorities

Moscow’s restraint stems from its careful balancing act in the Middle East. Russia maintains important ties with Israel and refuses to share advanced weapons with Iran because Moscow does not want them potentially directed at Israeli targets. Russia has cultivated relationships across the region that constrain how deeply it can align with Tehran. The Kremlin’s ties with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, represent important economic and diplomatic relationships that could be jeopardized by appearing as Iran’s military guarantor.

By 2025, Russia had made significant progress in domestic drone production and localized manufacturing of Iranian drone designs, reducing its urgent need for Iranian military assistance. This technological self-sufficiency has further diminished Tehran’s leverage over Moscow.

Iran’s Additional Constitutional Constraints on Foreign Policy

Beyond Article 9’s sovereignty prohibition, Iran’s constitution contains provisions that explicitly constrain foreign alliances. Article 152 mandates that Iranian foreign policy be “based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects” and “nonalignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers.” Article 153 explicitly forbids “any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country.” These provisions, which codify the Islamic Republic’s founding principle of “neither East nor West,” create legal constraints on how deeply Iran can integrate with any foreign power. A NATO-style mutual defense pact or extensive military basing rights would likely violate these constitutional provisions.

Economic Ties Remain Underdeveloped

Despite diplomatic rhetoric about comprehensive partnership, economic integration remains minimal. Bilateral trade between January and October 2024 reached only $3.77 billion a modest figure for nations described as strategic partners facing common adversaries. Economic ties have traditionally been weak in the Iran-Russia relationship. The inherent incompatibility and natural competition between the two economies are likely to limit the long-term growth of economic relations. Both nations are energy exporters competing in similar markets rather than possessing complementary economic structures that would facilitate deeper integration.

Growing Iranian Frustration

Iranian officials have increasingly voiced dissatisfaction with the relationship’s trajectory. In August 2025, Mohammad Sadr, a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, accused Russia of disclosing the locations of Iranian air defense systems and described the strategic alliance with Moscow as “worthless.” Such public criticism from senior Iranian officials reflects mounting frustration within Tehran’s political establishment. The perception that Iran provides tangible military support while receiving limited reciprocation has begun generating domestic political backlash.

Systemic Drivers of Continued Cooperation

Despite these limitations, the relationship will likely persist due to systemic pressures affecting both nations. As long as both countries remain in an antagonistic and oppositional position vis-à-vis Western states and Western-dominated international organizations, the Russia-Iran relationship is likely to continue deepening over time. Systemic pressures, including Western sanctions, military threats, and broader efforts to marginalize both countries, provide a strong foundation for continued cooperation. Recent efforts to institutionalize their relationship through the 2025 treaty and engagement in multilateral forums have fostered structural interdependence.

Neither nation possesses abundant alternative partners. Russia’s isolation following the Ukraine invasion and Iran’s decades under sanctions create mutual dependency born of necessity rather than strategic choice.

Conclusion: Strategic Transactionalism, Not Strategic Alliance

The Iran-Russia relationship combines pragmatic, interest-driven cooperation with growing ambitions for deeper strategic alignment, yet remains constrained by enduring limitations and competing priorities. For all the rhetoric of anti-Western solidarity, the relationship remains limited, interest-driven, and devoid of binding commitments. The relationship between Iran and Russia has reached new heights not because of any breakthrough treaty, but because of Russia’s isolation from the West amid the war in Ukraine. Cooperation between the two countries is deepening, but not rapidly, and within defined limits. The January 2025 treaty represents an attempt to formalize tactical cooperation rather than establish a transformative alliance. Moscow receives immediate military assistance for its Ukraine operations while maintaining flexibility to preserve relationships with Israel and Gulf states. Tehran gains diplomatic backing and limited technology transfers but lacks the security guarantees and advanced weapons systems it seeks.

This asymmetry will likely persist. Russia faces no constitutional constraints on foreign alliances and can calibrate its Iran relationship based purely on strategic calculation. Iran faces constitutional barriers embedded in Articles 9, 152, and 153 that prevent surrendering sovereignty to any foreign power a structural limitation that makes genuine alliance impossible regardless of geopolitical circumstances.

Policymakers in Western capitals should recognize this relationship for what it is: a marriage of convenience between isolated powers rather than an ideological alliance or axis of upheaval. The relationship’s structural limitations particularly Iran’s constitutional inability to cede sovereignty suggest it remains fundamentally constrained and vulnerable to shifts in the broader geopolitical landscape, particularly any diplomatic openings that might reduce either nation’s international isolation.