Nadhmi al-Nasr’s relatives knew enough to tell Ali AlAhmed that the former head of NEOM had been arrested in October 2026. They could not tell him where he was. AlAhmed published their account on November 20 for the Institute for Gulf Affairs, withholding their names because they feared for their safety. He reported months of questioning by the Saudi Presidency of State Security before the arrest and identified Al-Ha’ir prison, south of Riyadh, as a possible place of detention. The arrest remains a single-source report, with no public charge established. The man who once had to explain how nine million people would live inside two walls in the desert now has a family trying to establish where one man is being held.
Mohammed bin Salman chaired the company that employed al-Nasr, and he chairs the sovereign wealth fund that controls it, and the security apparatus named in the family’s account answers to him. The available reporting leaves the immediate grounds for the arrest unresolved. The case for holding the crown prince responsible for NEOM runs through decisions he made in public and decisions his own staff described to reporters. He sold the city, defended the dimensions that made it ruinously expensive, and retained the offices that could authorize the spending and set the terms of the retreat. Two years after NEOM announced the departure of the engineer it entrusted with the work, his relatives had to speak without their names. The chairman still has his name on the launch announcement.
The engineer from Saihat
Al-Nasr came out of Saudi Aramco. He worked on the development of Shaybah, where the company had to establish access to an oilfield deep in the Empty Quarter. AlAhmed describes a runway built with material hauled over dunes and crews flown in on small planes. The runway had a job and the oilfield had an owner, a product and a buyer. The order of operations was intelligible to anybody who had to get equipment to the site. Al-Nasr went on to help establish King Abdullah University of Science and Technology and serve as acting president of the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center. When he took over NEOM in 2018, he brought three decades of industrial experience to a company whose most valuable asset was the crown prince’s word.
He also came from a prominent Shia family in Saihat, on the Gulf coast in Qatif. His appointment put a Shia industrial executive in charge of the most conspicuous venture in a state whose treatment of Shia citizens has long included discrimination and repression. His background helps explain what was unusual about the appointment and what it meant to have the family speak anonymously from the Eastern Province. AlAhmed’s report cites sources close to the family who said corruption was the purported reason for the arrest. The account gives no document setting out an offense. It also relays allegations that well-connected Saudis resented losing access to contracts. The people who could settle those questions hold the procurement records and the interrogation records.
Al-Nasr had six years in office, during which NEOM committed extraordinary sums and the authorities cleared residents from land the company wanted. His years at Aramco explain why the palace hired him. His decisions at NEOM deserve a public accounting in their own right. The board named Aiman al-Mudaifer acting chief in November 2024 and made him permanent in May 2025. Al-Mudaifer came from PIF’s domestic real estate division. The company changed the man who ran the development and the fund that financed it supplied the replacement, and yet the chairman who had insisted on the city’s defining specifications remained in place to preside over the review of his own project.
The Ritz-Carlton detentions put the Saudi meaning of an anti-corruption inquiry on public display in 2017. Mohammed bin Salman led the committee. The royal court said it had summoned 381 people and recovered more than 400 billion riyals in cash, property, companies and other assets. Human Rights Watch documented allegations of coercion and ill-treatment during the campaign. The figure of 381 describes people summoned, a broader category than people detained at the hotel. The royal court could tell the kingdom what it said it had recovered to the riyal’s order of magnitude, and yet the process by which the state took possession of those assets happened outside the scrutiny a public trial would have supplied.
The Ritz precedent gives the corruption explanation circulating around al-Nasr a particular weight. A corruption charge could involve legitimate questions about vendors, hotel projections and decisions taken under his authority. It could also give the state a reason to examine those questions in a room where it controls who can speak and which documents leave. The same year that the crown prince announced how much money his new development would command, he put the country’s business elite on notice about how little control they had over the process by which the state could take their assets. For a manager entrusted with awarding work on the prince’s own development, the boundaries of an ordinary commercial decision were already plain.
A room for $1,866
The Public Investment Fund introduced NEOM in October 2017 with more than $500 billion in prospective backing from the kingdom, the fund and investors. Years later, in an offering circular for capital markets, PIF still put expected project capital expenditure at approximately $500 billion. Meanwhile NEOM’s signature city acquired the form the world came to recognize, a 170-kilometer development between parallel structures rising 500 meters, eventually intended to house nine million people. The same state was selling investors a funding proposition and selling the public a building whose geometry had become a matter of royal prestige. The people responsible for making one proposition fit the other had to bring their calculations back to the man who had announced both.
The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2025 that a draft board presentation put the cost of building NEOM to its envisioned final state at $8.8 trillion, with completion in 2080. The first phase alone was projected to require $370 billion by 2035. The $8.8 trillion figure describes a buildout scenario over decades. The $64 billion reported spent by mid-2026 and the $16 billion later budgeted for anticipated contractor exits describe different things. Each figure answers a separate question about what the board had contemplated, what the kingdom had already spent and what it expected to owe for stopping. The 2080 date also puts the internal planning horizon half a century beyond the year stamped on the kingdom’s entire reform program.
The Journal also obtained a draft internal audit that found evidence of deliberate manipulation by members of management. As construction costs rose, projected nightly rates for a hiking hotel went from $489 to $1,866, and a proposed glamping site went from $216 to $704. A room at $1,866 puts an answer in the revenue column before anybody has paid for the room. It can also keep a project looking viable long enough for the next commitment to be approved. The consultants and managers could take credit for a profitable resort in the model while the eventual operator would have to find actual customers willing to pay almost four times what the original model assumed. A higher bid for construction had become an occasion to assume a richer hiker.
McKinsey & Company worked on NEOM’s planning and on validating projections, the Journal reported, and was earning more than $130 million a year from the engagement. The firm told the paper it had protocols to prevent conflicts of interest. The audit’s finding concerned members of management, and the reporting does not establish who entered every figure or who approved every change. The record gives ample reason to ask what the client was purchasing when it hired a consultant that could help shape the development and then be paid to assess the numbers used to justify it. At a reported $130 million a year, someone found a profitable business in Tabuk before the hikers arrived.
The prince had a chance to lower the towers. Staff explored cutting the height from 500 meters to about 1,000 feet, and the Journal reported that Mohammed bin Salman rejected the reduction. Lowering a building of that scale changes what the engineers have to carry and brace, what has to be lifted, and how much usable structure a contractor can deliver for the money. Keeping the height kept those costs in the project. Management could have concealed the extent of the overruns, as the Journal’s reporting indicates, and the prince could still insist on the specification that helped produce them. His own decision survives every explanation that lays the manipulated forecasts at the feet of his employees.
An opening before the opening
Sindalah gave the board a chance to show a customer something smaller than a city. The island had a marina and was meant to receive yacht owners and resort guests in the Red Sea. The Saudi Press Agency announced its opening in October 2024. The Journal reportedthat the party cost at least $45 million and that the prince stayed away. Parts of the resort were still unfinished. A board announcing a commercial opening had good reason to know how many rooms were ready, whether restaurants could serve guests and what it was possible to book for the week after the invitees departed. It had a figure for the launch party.
A resort can miss its opening and still attract paying guests once the work is done. At Sindalah the board took the credit for opening while the job of finishing the resort remained. The official date let the company sell a milestone to prospective partners while it still had a construction job on its hands. Anyone trying to judge the economics from the announcement would need the figures a resort operator lives by, including rooms available, rates actually paid, occupancy and operating costs. A launch budget tells you how much the owner is willing to pay to have guests in the room once.
Al-Nasr was out within weeks of the party. Semafor reported in May 2026 that work on The Line would be deferred until after 2030 and that NEOM was now aiming to house up to 100,000 people across the development by the end of the decade, down from an earlier ambition of 1.5 million. The 100,000 includes NEOM as a whole. It cannot be counted as the projected population of the mirrored towers. Saudis could still be shown the old images while management redirected money toward a working port and the utilities that industrial users need. A city sold as an escape from ordinary limits had turned into a company review about which ordinary infrastructure it could still afford.
Sixty billion riyals to stop
The Olympic Council of Asia now lists Almaty, Kazakhstan, as the host of the 2029 Asian Winter Games once awarded to Trojena. In March 2026 the Italian builder Webuild told investors that NEOM had exercised its right to terminate a contract covering three dams, a freshwater lake and a structure called The Bow. The two decisions answer to different calendars. The Olympic council had athletes to bring to a venue by a fixed date. The contractor had a client whose plans had changed after the work had been awarded. Saudi officials could continue talking about the future of Trojena while Almaty prepared for the games and Webuild accounted for the loss of work.
At the World Cup, the promised attraction was a football pitch more than 350 meters above ground inside The Line. The Saudi bid put it there, and FIFA awarded the kingdom the 2034 tournament in December 2024. In October 2026 Reuters reported that the proposed NEOM stadium was being shelved, with construction intelligence provider MEED Projects listing it as on hold. FIFA publicly celebrated the bid, and the venue depended on a host structure that the kingdom had already put off building. FIFA could give Riyadh the tournament on the strength of the bid, and the bid could confer international credibility on The Line, and yet the builders still had to deliver a place for spectators to stand.
Semafor reported in June that NEOM’s budget for 2026 through 2030 provided for 60 billion riyals, or $16 billion, in anticipated payments to end long-term contracts. The same reporting put cumulative expenditure at about $64 billion. An exit provision measures what the company thinks unwinding its commitments will cost. The obligations come from the agreements signed when the development was still going ahead, and the contractors can seek payment as the client changes course. A stadium can vanish from a schedule while the terms signed to build the development around it retain their force. The press office can change the verb from building to reviewing. The outstanding claims belong to the same project in either tense.
The $64 billion covered NEOM as a whole, including work with a purpose beyond The Line. Count it all as the price of a trench and the chairman gets an easy rebuttal in the form of a port. The better comparison is between the commercial arrangements behind the projects that can still find a customer. In 2023 NEOM Green Hydrogen Company announced an $8.4 billion financing package. Its owners were NEOM, ACWA Power and Air Products. Air Products agreed to take the plant’s ammonia output under a 30-year agreement. The project has a buyer identified in advance and a contract that says how long the buying is supposed to last. The hiking hotel had a revised room rate.
The people who could be moved
Abdul Rahim al-Huwaiti worked for the Saudi Ministry of Finance and lived in al-Khuraiba, one of the villages the authorities needed to clear for NEOM. He refused to let a land registry committee into his house on April 12, 2020, filmed the officials and posted his objections to the eviction. Special Forces surrounded the house the next morning and killed him. ALQST’s account, based on witnesses, says the forces opened fire and al-Huwaiti briefly returned fire. The Saudi authorities described him as a wanted terrorist who shot at the security forces. UN experts raised his killing with the government. In the space of a day, a Finance Ministry employee who objected to officials measuring his property had become a dead man whose right to remain in his home could be discussed as a security offense.
The UN experts named Shadly Ahmad Mahmoud Abou Taqiqa al-Huwaiti, Ibrahim Salih Ahmad Abou Khalil al-Huwaiti and Atallah Moussa Mohammed al-Huwaiti in a May 2023 warning about death sentences. They raised the use of the Saudi counterterrorism law against members of the tribe resisting eviction and reported lengthy prison terms for others. Abdullah Dakhilallah al-Huwaiti, a former municipal employee in al-Khuraiba, received 50 years, according to MENA Rights Group. Trojena’s builders had contractual terms on which to contest what they were owed, and the company could budget for the cost of releasing them from their agreements, and yet a man who resisted the seizure of land in the same development could have the rest of his working life taken by a court. What would the cost of acquiring that land have been if residents could bargain over it without risking prison?
A worker who leveled ground at a NEOM project told Human Rights Watch that his pay was 800 riyals a month against the 1,000 he had been promised. He had paid more than $1,000 in illegal recruitment fees to get there. Another worker said he had been promised an indoor waiter’s job at 1,200 riyals and found himself outside doing construction for 800. The loss starts before the worker collects a wage. A recruitment fee creates a debt, a lower wage stretches the time needed to repay it, and restrictions on changing employers narrow the choices available to the person carrying the debt. A procurement system that could find money to adjust to higher bids relied on workers who had to absorb a reduction in what they were promised after they had traveled to take the job.
The Wall Street Journal obtained recordings of Wayne Borg, a former studio executive who ran NEOM’s media division. After three migrant workers died in separate site incidents, the problem he voiced was a Sunday meeting. The recorded complaint, published in September 2024, is intelligible alongside the testimony about pay. For the worker, the employer could change the work and reduce the wage after he arrived. For an executive, the deaths of three men meant management had intruded on his weekend. The board sold an advanced city to the outside world while the people who dug for it were still trying to collect the wages they had agreed to before leaving home.
The oil money and the chairman
Saudi Aramco paid $85.5 billion in total dividends in 2025, down from about $124.2 billion in 2024. Its base dividend payments increased. The performance-linked distribution fell from $43.09 billion to $880 million, accounting for the drop in total payments. For a state and a sovereign fund with exposure to Aramco’s distributions, a reduction in that cash has consequences even if the shares keep a large value on the books. A fund can own valuable assets and still have to decide which contractor to pay from cash available this year. The Ministry of Finance’s original 2026 budget projected expenditure of 1.313 trillion riyals against revenue of 1.147 trillion and put the deficit at 165 billion riyals. Its report for the first nine months recorded a deficit of more than 244 billion riyals, already above the original estimate for the whole year. The state can borrow and it can redirect investment, and yet neither maneuver turns a promised hotel rate into somebody’s payment or makes completed work appear at a venue chosen by FIFA.
The war with Iran made an existing financing problem harder to manage and gave NEOM’s Red Sea port real work to do. Semafor reported that the review put money toward Oxagon and logistics as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz drove interest in alternative routes. The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+, effective May 1, added a separate complication for Riyadh’s management of supply. Neither event explains why a draft board presentation years earlier already put completion in 2080. Nor can a wartime need for Red Sea freight vindicate the board’s decision to make the usefulness of the larger development answer to an architectural spectacle. A ship can unload on the Red Sea while the plan for nine million people in mirrored towers remains an expense the chairman chose.
The original $500 billion proposition depended in part on outside capital, which would have reduced the amount Saudi Arabia had to put up itself. In practice an international contractor could take paid work without investing in the city, a consultant could earn fees without underwriting a hotel and a sporting body could award an event without financing its stadium. Riyadh could display all three relationships as evidence that the world believed in the project, and yet the construction bill still came back to the Saudi client. When the state put less money into the build, its ability to attract companies with contracts to sell proved a poor measure of its ability to attract investors willing to live on what the development earned.
A credible investigation would have to let al-Nasr answer in public for what he approved and identify who instructed him to proceed when his staff brought back the costs. It would have to give the former chief executive access to counsel and to the documents, and it would have to put his answers alongside the chairman’s instructions. Saudi Arabia has shown how much detail it can produce when it wants the world to believe in a project. Its football bid could tell FIFA the height of a pitch that had yet to be built. The Institute for Gulf Affairs reported that the family of the man who ran the project had no confirmed location for him. His family is owed an address.



