The Shadow of Instability: Al-Shabaab’s Potential Resurgence and Peacekeeping Prospects in the Wake of Somaliland’s Recognition
Clans of Somaliland: two-thirds of the territory is controlled by the Pro-Union clans, their motivations stem from clan loyalty, historical grievances towards Somaliland and commitment to Somali unity
The Fractured Path to Recognition and Emerging Tensions
In a landmark yet contentious move, Israel became the first United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation on December 26, 2025, marking a significant escalation in the breakaway region’s long-standing quest for independence. Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991 following a brutal civil war, has operated as a de facto state with its own government, currency, and security forces. However, this recognition—framed under the spirit of the Abraham Accords—has ignited widespread condemnation and raised alarms about regional stability in the Horn of Africa.
The agreement between Israel and Somaliland emphasizes cooperation in technology, agriculture, health, and security, potentially granting Israel access to strategic Red Sea ports like Berbera. Celebrations erupted in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, where Israeli and Somaliland flags waved side by side, symbolizing a breakthrough after decades of diplomatic isolation; simultaneously, protests were reported from near the Bab al-Mandab strait in Awdal State, where members of the Samaroon tribe mobilized to oppose the independence declaration, they openly displayed Palestinian flags to show solidarity with Palestine and to reject the move as “Isaaq-Clan Family” idea for a breakaway territory. This development has been met with swift rejection from major international bodies. The African Union (AU) “firmly rejects” any recognition of Somaliland, reaffirming its unwavering commitment to Somalia’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Similarly, the European Union (EU) has backed Somalia, urging de-escalation, while the United Nations and Arab League have called for restraint, warning that the move threatens international peace. Houthis threaten to STRIKE Israel in Somaliland; Houthi Leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared that “Israeli presence… will be considered military TARGET’ and will not let ‘part of Somalia be turned into FOOTHOLD for Israeli enemy at expense of Somalia’s independence.” Israel’s involvement in the region will be a boom for Al-Shabab, which will leverage anti-Israel sentiment that has proliferated recently to increase the number of its recruits and financial aid. And this happens as the Houthis are reaching out to Al-Shabab!
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud denounced the recognition as a “threat to regional stability,” viewing it as an assault on Somali sovereignty. This sentiment echoes broader African and global consensus, with 21 Arab, Islamic, and African nations issuing a joint statement against the decision. The United States, under President Donald Trump, has notably refrained from following suit. Despite earlier indications in August 2025 that the U.S. was “looking into” recognition in exchange for military basing rights and mineral deals, recent reports confirm Trump is “not ready” to embrace Somaliland’s independence. This hesitation stems from concerns that such a move could undermine U.S.-Somalia security cooperation, push Mogadishu closer to Turkey, and exacerbate internal Somali crises. [ Somalia was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 term and is set to chair the Council in January 2026, taking the rotating presidency for that month]
Compounding these tensions are clan dynamics within Somaliland. Dominated by the Isaaq clan (70-80% of the population) controls the capital and central region, the region’s push for independence is opposed by pro-union tribes like the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli (Darod/Harti) in the east, and Gadabuursi and Issa (Dir) in the west, who control significant territory [along with its mineral resources] and favor reunification with Somalia due to kinship ties, economic grievances, and nationalist sentiments. Recent protests in Awdal and clashes in Sool highlight these divisions, potentially creating fertile ground for instability.
The Specter of Al-Shabaab’s Resurgence Amid Fragmentation
The partial recognition of Somaliland arrives at a precarious moment for Somalia, where al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab has shown signs of resurgence, exploiting political disunity and security vacuums. Al-Shabaab, which has waged a 16-year insurgency against the Somali government, has intensified attacks in south-central regions like Hirshabelle, recapturing strategic villages and towns in recent months. Analysts warn that Somaliland’s de facto separation could further fragment Somalia, providing al-Shabaab with opportunities to expand northward or infiltrate contested border areas.
Somaliland’s stability has historically insulated it from al-Shabaab’s reach, thanks to clan-based security arrangements. However, the group’s adaptability—demonstrated by its survival despite U.S.-backed offensives—poses a real threat. In 2025 alone, al-Shabaab launched ambitious offensives, reversing government gains and exploiting rivalries between federal and state authorities. Disunity remains the militants’ greatest weapon: cyclical conflicts between Mogadishu, regional states, and opposition groups have undermined counter-terrorism efforts.
If Somaliland’s recognition leads to escalated border disputes—such as those in Sool and Sanaag, where pro-union clans have resisted Hargeisa’s control—al-Shabaab could capitalize on the chaos. The group has a history of infiltrating clan militias and using ideological appeals to recruit from marginalized communities. Ethiopia’s alleged ultimatum in August 2025 for Somali federal forces to leave the border town of Beled Hawo underscores existing frictions, potentially drawing in external actors and creating porous frontiers for militants. Kenya and Ethiopia, both pro-Israel and wary of Egypt and Turkey’s influence in Somalia, may bolster anti-al-Shabaab operations, but their involvement could also inflame tensions if perceived as supporting fragmentation.
Moreover, Somalia’s federal government risks losing focus on al-Shabaab amid diplomatic fallout. The U.S. has backstopped Mogadishu’s campaigns, but strained relations due to non-recognition could reduce aid, allowing al-Shabaab to thrive; recent operations, conducted by AFRICOM, between November-10 and last week suggest rising casualties among civilians, resulting in anger and disappointment with American involvement. Reports from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies indicate Somalia is at risk of becoming a jihadist state, with al-Shabaab posing a serious threat to Mogadishu due to political breakdowns. In this context, Somaliland’s independence could inadvertently empower the group by diverting resources and fostering a narrative of Somali disunity, potentially leading to increased attacks on both sides of the de facto border.
Prospects for Djibouti and AU Peacekeeping Intervention
As tensions mount, the possibility of peacekeeping intervention by Djibouti or the African Union in Somaliland looms large, driven by commitments to Somali unity and regional security. Djibouti, a key contributor to AU missions in Somalia, signed an agreement in August 2025 for additional troop deployments to Somali territory, emphasizing coordination against al-Shabaab. This pact, signed in Djibouti City, underscores the nation’s “unwavering” support for Somalia’s stability, with Djiboutian forces already stationed in Hiraan region hotspots like Beledweyne and Buula-Burte.
The new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), effective since January 2025, replaces the previous ATMIS and includes troops from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Mandated to combat al-Shabaab and stabilize the region, AUSSOM’s framework could extend to Somaliland if clan conflicts escalate into broader violence. The AU’s Peace and Security Council, in its December 15, 2025, communiqué, reiterated support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, rejecting any moves toward secession.
Djibouti’s role is particularly pivotal due to its geographic proximity and historical ties. Sharing a border with Somaliland’s Awdal region, where pro-union sentiments run high, Djibouti could intervene to prevent spillover effects, such as refugee flows or militant incursions. Recent bilateral talks in Mogadishu focused on enhancing security cooperation, potentially paving the way for Djiboutian forces to bolster Somali federal troops in disputed areas. However, any direct AU or Djiboutian deployment in Somaliland would require UN Security Council approval and face resistance from Hargeisa, which views such actions as infringement on its sovereignty.
International rejection of Somaliland’s recognition strengthens the case for intervention. The UN’s call for an emergency meeting and the EU’s backing of Somalia suggest multilateral pressure to maintain the status quo. Exercises like Justified Accord 2025, involving multinational forces, highlight readiness for crisis response. Yet, challenges abound: Ethiopia’s pro-Somaliland stance, including its Berbera port deal, could complicate AU unity, while al-Shabaab’s resurgence might divert resources southward.
In conclusion, Somaliland’s recognition by Israel offers little legitimacy, while it risks unleashing al-Shabaab’s resurgence through heightened fragmentation. Djibouti and the AU stand poised for intervention, but success hinges on diplomatic restraint and unified action to preserve Horn of Africa stability.