When Riyadh turns on Abu Dhabi, the shock waves will reach Islamabad
Saudis warning, and demanding that the United Arab Emirates leave Yemen within twenty four hours is not merely signal of “tactical dispute”. It exposes a deeper truth that many in the region have quietly acknowledged for years. The Saudi Emirati partnership is no longer an alliance of shared destiny. It is a relationship strained by rivalry, ambition, and competing visions of power.
For a decade, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi presented a united front. Yemen, Iran, political Islam, and regional order appeared to bind them together. Yet Yemen itself has revealed the limits of that unity. Saudi Arabia entered the war to secure its borders and restore a friendly central government. The UAE pursued control of ports, trade routes, and southern Yemeni proxies. What began as coordination evolved into competition.
A Saudi ultimatum marks the moment when quiet disagreement has become open confrontation.
This rupture would not be confined to Yemen. It would reflect a broader struggle for leadership in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia seeks primacy through scale, religious authority, and economic transformation. The UAE seeks influence through agility, capital, and control of strategic geography. Vision 2030 directly challenges Dubai’s regional dominance. Energy policy disputes inside OPEC reflect diverging national interests rather than shared strategy. Across Sudan, Libya, and the Horn of Africa, both states increasingly back rival actors.
In short, the Gulf’s most powerful partnership is giving way to a cold rivalry.
For Pakistan, this matters more than most policymakers in Islamabad may publicly admit.
Pakistan’s economy, diaspora, and foreign policy have long been intertwined with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Millions of Pakistani workers live in the two countries. Remittances from the Gulf remain a critical economic lifeline. Military cooperation, financial assistance, and diplomatic backing from Riyadh have historically shaped Pakistan’s regional posture. At the same time, Abu Dhabi has emerged as a major investor and political partner.
A Saudi Emirati split would force Pakistan into an uncomfortable balancing act.
Islamabad has traditionally leaned toward Saudi Arabia in moments of regional tension, particularly on issues tied to the Islamic world. Yet the UAE’s economic leverage and growing political assertiveness make neutrality harder to sustain. Any visible pressure to choose sides would strain Pakistan’s already delicate foreign policy calculus.
There is also the Yemen factor. Pakistan previously resisted Saudi requests for military involvement in Yemen, citing internal security concerns and parliamentary opposition. A Saudi Emirati confrontation over Yemen would reopen old debates in Islamabad about alliance commitments, strategic autonomy, and the costs of entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts.
Beyond Pakistan, the broader fallout would be destabilizing. A fractured Gulf weakens collective Arab leverage, invites external powers to exploit divisions, and injects uncertainty into energy markets and maritime security. Smaller Gulf states would hedge. Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia would quietly benefit.
Riyadh’s ultimatum to Abu Dhabi does not only affect Yemen alone. It would be about the end of an era in Gulf politics. Alliances once built on shared threats are now undone by competing ambitions.
For Pakistan, the lesson is clear. The assumption of a unified Gulf is no longer safe. Strategic flexibility is no longer optional. And silence, once a viable strategy, may soon become a liability.



